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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that hate crime is simply an inherent and normal component of 
contemporary society. Regardless of a concerted intervention – legislative, situational and 
social crime prevention – against this significant social problem in the USA and Europe in 
recent years, there remains a ubiquitous, albeit often latent, continued existence of hate 
motivation throughout society which remains at a considerable and increasing risk of 
actualisation as individuals come into contact with other likeminded individuals. This is 
particularly an issue in the information age which has greatly enhanced the spatial proximity 
of these hate-minded people to each other. It is shown that an established body of 
sociologically informed criminological theory – in particular that founded on the European 
and US anomie traditions – can be adapted to explain and understand the existence and 
persistence of hate motivation at all levels of the social world. This provides the basis for an 
extensive educative - and thus preventive - programme to tackle pervasive cultures of hate.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Definition and Prevalence of Hate Crime 
There are various definitions of ‘hate crime’ – or crimes of bias - but Barbara Perry (2001: 
10) offers the following accessible and practical definition: ‘Hate crime is a mechanism of 
power and oppression involving acts of violence and intimidation against already stigmatised 
and marginalised groups, and intended to re-affirm the precarious hierarchies that 
characterise the given social order’. Perpetrators of hate activity are thus those unaccepting of 
the heterogeneous nature of the contemporary societies in which they live and primarily 
characterise social groups according to their visible ethnic, racial or sexual identity rather 
than their personal attributes. From that cause, a key component of hate victimisation is the 
existence of bias and prejudice based upon ‘what’ someone is, rather than ‘who’ they 
actually are. 
 
‘Hate crimes’ are significant. Figures collated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 
the USA (FBI, 2003) show that hate crimes involve a higher level of assaults against the 
person than crimes generally. 45% to 55% of bias crimes are personal assaults, whereas only 
10% of all crimes involve assault. Hate crimes are more violent than crimes generally. 
Assaults causing physical injury occur in 74% of bias crimes, versus 29% of non-bias crimes. 
Attacks are often preceded by a series of confrontations and incidents that escalate in 
severity. Hate crimes are more likely than other criminal activity to be committed by groups 
of perpetrators. Most crimes against the person are committed by someone the victim knows, 
hate crimes, however, are more likely to be committed by strangers (FB1, 2003:2). In the 
UK, the number of racist incidents recorded by the police rose from 11,878 in 1994/5 to 
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47,814 in 1999/2000 (Kershaw et al., 2000). Seeking to reduce hate crimes is thus 
unequivocally a worthwhile criminological enterprise. 
 
 
Dimensions of Intervention 
Three broad dimensions of intervention that seek to reduce hate crimes can be identified; the 
criminal law, situational crime prevention and social crime prevention. The first dimension, 
the criminal law, seeks either to deter motivated individuals to act on their prejudices for fear 
of the consequences or to suitably punish apprehended perpetrators. In the USA there has 
been a major legislative offensive against hate crimes in recent years and Morgan (2002) 
identifies a significant threefold trend. First, there is the inclusion of the notion of hate 
motivation on the part of the offender. Second, there is the provision for enhanced penalties 
for motivated offenders. Third, there is the identification of specific victimised groups where 
such enhanced penalties should be applied.3 Morgan argues that this body of legislation 
problematises the position of victims who are targets of hate crimes but have failed to 
organise on the basis of identity politics, lack political clout, have insufficient moral status, 
or who see hate crime legislation as an ineffective way of dealing with their particular 
concerns. This legislation is thus the source of serious acrimony with inequities built into the 
alignment between proving hate intent and the enhanced penalty approach giving higher 
symbolic status to some groups. It is a perspective resonant with that of Jacobs and Potter 
(1998) who are sympathetic to a traditional rule-of-law perspective that argues that all 
offences should receive equal criminal justice intervention regardless of offender motivation 
and identity of victim group. A universal criminal justice intervent ion strategy is nonetheless 
                                                 
3 There is no specific hate crimes legislation in the UK but such offences are covered by both the Public Order 
Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Metropolitan Police record offences as being hate 
motivated if that is the view of the victim. 
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problematic because the police service has a long recognised lack of resources, which makes 
the prioritisation of certain categories of crime inevitable (see Hopkins Burke, 2004). 
  
The second dimension of intervention, situational crime prevention strategies, is less 
concerned with the problem of identifying and proving motivation than in changing the 
situations in which crime occurs and reducing the opportunity to offend. The intention is to 
pre-empt crime and rests largely on the premise that if the criminal opportunity is removed 
the criminal act cannot take place. This approach – certainly in its more recent manifestations 
(see Felson and Clarke, 1998; Sutton, 2004) - does not deny the issue of criminal motivation, 
but is theoretically underpinned by contemporary rational actor theory premises that crime is 
the result of people making choices and decisions to offend based on perceptions of risk and 
rewards, or costs and benefits, of their actions (see Hopkins Burke, 2001: 40-48 for an 
overview). Motivation is thus explained by rational choice. Offenders choose to act in a 
certain way because these actions appear to them rational in the circumstances in which they 
find themselves and in terms of their knowledge base and cognitive thought processes.4  
 
Expressive crimes such as vandalism are well explained by the related concept of crime as a 
function of opportunity and routine activities (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Such offences are 
usually unplanned and most likely to occur in places where the potential perpetrators are 
likely to find themselves in the normal course of their lives. A crime such as arson, for 
example, may have a financial motive, but it is more likely to be committed for expressive 
reward, to gain the approval of peers, to ‘get back at’ a target (such as a school) (see Knights, 
                                                 
4 Clarke (1987) uses the terms limited or bounded form of rationality to describe a situation where the 
individual will not always obtain all the facts needed to make a wise decision and the information available will 
not necessarily be weighed carefully. 
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1998) or simply to alleviate boredom. All of these explanations can be conceptualised as at 
least sub-motivations in the execution of hate crime attacks. 
 
Situational crime prevention strategies can be devised to protect targets and remove 
opportunities attractive to actual and potential perpetrators of hate crimes. Many potential 
casual participants encouraged by peer group pressure to engage in such activities might well 
be deflected from involvement in hate crimes by the difficulties encountered in doing so. But 
others will not be deterred and many might baulk at the notion that such people are merely 
displaced, left to wander free and untroubled with their poisonous and objectionable views 
intact until they discover the right opportunity and/or like-minded others with whom they 
might act to operationalise their hate.5 Thus, addressing the issue of motivation is a 
worthwhile objective. 
 
The third dimension of intervention, social crime prevent ion initiatives, emphasise the need 
to eliminate criminogenic environments which encourage criminal motivation. It is an 
approach that ‘aims to prevent people drifting into crime by improving social conditions, 
strengthening community institutions and enhancing recreational, educational and 
employment opportunities’ (Bright, 1991: 62). During the past twenty-five years, in the UK, 
there have been a multitude of government sponsored social crime prevention initiatives 
introduced that have sought to intervene, in particular in the lives of young people, who have 
become involved in - or increasingly at risk of - offending behaviour with the intention of 
diverting them from these activities into a law-abiding existence (see Hughes, 1998; 
Crawford, 1998). A particularly effective but widely unsung organisation in the UK context 
                                                 
5 Barr and Pease (1992) argue that displacement can be benign and neutral as well as malign and propose – in 
an argument commensurate with that of left realists (see Lea and Young, 1984) - that there can be a diffusion of 
benefits and attrition and a more equitable distribution of crime. 
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is the local authority youth services who engage with often troubled and troublesome young 
people but can - as a recent national audit of their activities has shown - engage with and 
engender a more positive outlook (Orrock and Hopkins Burke, 2003). Such interventions can 
and apparently do successfully challenge the presumptions, attitudes and indeed ideologies of 
at least some young people.6 Whether or not such projects provide a cost effective general 
panacea for the reduction of hate crime motivation is both unclear and probably unlikely. For 
such intervention is invariably a reactive response to well-established and strongly founded 
worldviews that are quite understandable in the social circumstances in which the young 
people – and indeed us – live.        
 
The Focus of the Paper 
It is the central contention of this paper that involvement in hate crime should be considered 
a normal, rational and fully understandable activity in our society. It is acknowledged that the 
three dimensions of intervention outlined above have had - and will have further - success in 
the reduction of hate crime. Nonetheless the problem both persists and with the increasing 
development of information technology the  potential for growth in this significant social 
problem has never been greater. Challenging the basis of rational hate crime motivation, the 
worldview of the offender, or why it is that the person thinks the way they do, is thus a 
legitimate and extremely worthwhile project.  
 
Few researchers have attempted to situate hate crime within a theoretical framework. There is 
invariably an assumption that the perpetrators of such offences are in some way 
psychologically troubled individuals or groups of such like-minded individuals. Only, 
Barbara Perry (2000), Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips (2002) have sought to situate racial 
                                                 
6 If it is reasonable to use such extravagant terms as ‘ideology’ for what are often ill-thought out and barely articulated 
worldviews. 
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hate crime within a socio-political criminological theoretical framework. This paper seeks to 
make a modest contribution to that literature by outlining and discussing the contribution of 
sociologically informed criminological theory to providing an explanation of the existence 
and persistence of hate crime motivation – or why it is that such behaviour is a rational act 
for those involved – with the intention of aiding those involved in the three identified 
dimensions of intervention.  
 
The theories discussed are situated in three chronological groupings. First, we address the 
early-European anomie tradition encountered in the work of Emile Durkheim (1933, 
originally 1893) - albeit in terms of the methodological individualist interpretation of his 
work first articulated by Raymond Boudon (1980) - which helps us to make sense of the 
notion that hate crime motivation has its foundations in the origins and later development of 
societal structure. Second, we discuss the mid-twentieth century US anomie tradition - with 
its origins in the work of Robert Merton (1938) and his notion of differential adaptations via 
Edwin Sutherland (1939, 1947) and ‘differential association’, to the deviant subcultural 
theories of Albert Cohen (1955) and on to the non determinist critique of David Matza 
(1964) – that demonstrates how hate crime motivation has not just strongly founded macro 
societal origins but can occur as the outcome of rationally developed strategies developed, or 
encountered, by socio-economically disaffected people, with disparate commitment levels, at 
a local or micro societal level. Third, we develop the previous themes in terms of a more 
recent radical European tradition with nonetheless firm identifiable foundations in both 
earlier anomie traditions and which helps us to explain the complexities and variations of 
hate crime motivation in contemporary fragmented communities. We start with a discussion 
of the radical neo-Marxist sub-cultural theories formulated by the Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies (Brake, 1985; P. Cohen, 1972; S. Cohen, 1973; Hebdige, 
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1976, 1979) and develop their argument through the postmodern variant of Hopkins Burke 
and Ros Sunley (1996, 1998) before locating this in a poststructuralist conception of power 
(Foucault, 1980) to show how from this perspective rationally developed hate motivations 
have their origins in the relationship of individual young people – and their often chosen – 
sub-cultural grouping to specific developments in the contemporary mode of production. We 
commence our discussion with a consideration of the early European anomie tradition and 
the very origins of societal organisation wherein lie the foundations of hate motivation. 
 
THE EARLY EUROPEAN ANOMIE TRADITION 
 
The Origins of Society 
In considering the socio-economic factors that lead to the creation and transmission through 
time of hate motivation it is appropriate to consider the essential origins of society. For 
economists the key factor in the beginning - and throughout history - is that of resource 
scarcity and the competition and collaboration that follows to acquire and distribute these 
(Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 2003). For sociologists, all societies have their origins in the 
sex taboo - the nature of which varies between geographical location - and which outlines 
who one can legitimately have sex with and, importantly in the context of this paper, who 
you may not (Giddens, 2001). It is through the creation and establishment of familial lines 
that power-blocks are initially created to ensure access to economic resources, their retention 
and protection, not least through inheritance. We have here a socio-economic explanation of 
the origins of all societies that makes considerable sense when discussing the notion of social 
solidarity contained in the work of Emile Durkheim (1933). 
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Emile Durkheim and Social Solidarity 
The French social theorist Emile Durkheim writing at the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth centuries provides a discussion of social solidarity in both earlier 
simple and later more complex societies that is fundamental to our pursuit of the origins of 
hate crime motivation. First, it is appropriate to post a note of explanation regarding our 
methodological interpretation of Durkheim. A fundamental recurring criticism of Durkheim 
emphasised in virtually any introductory sociology text refers to his apparently unassailable 
methodological collectivism or over-determinism as it is usually termed. Individuals 
apparently seem to have little, indeed no, choice in their actions; or to use the language of 
one of us elsewhere, their lives appear predestined because of the social conditions in which 
they live (Hopkins Burke, 2001). It is without doubt this functionalist interpretation of 
Durkheim - where it appears impossible to locate any acceptable mechanism to account for 
social change - that has led to his work being almost universally dismissed as 
methodologically and politically conservative. We in fact follow the methodological 
individualist reinterpretation of Durkheim contained in the work of his fellow - but more 
recent - French compatriot Raymond Boudon (1980) and recognise that individuals do come 
together with others and form coalitions of interest on which they act and that it is in this way 
that social change can and does occur. Opportunities for conceiving of, and carrying out, that 
action are nonetheless invariably constrained by – sometimes overwhelming - structural 
constraints, not least the more strongly asserted, believed and enforced conscience collectives 
that are the products of the ultra, or intense, mechanical solidarities that dominate not only 
simple societies but also pockets of va rying size within more complex contemporary 
societies. In short, individual choice - or acceptance or rejection of a particular way of life - 
is possible, from this perspective, but the choices available may be limited, or, in some cases, 
virtually non-existent. We now turn our attention to the substantive social theory of 
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Durkheim and its significance for understanding the origins and indeed persistence of hate 
crime motivation. 
 
Durkheim (1933) proposed that earlier more simple forms of society – with high levels of 
‘mechanical’ solidarity – were characterised by a likeness and similarity between individuals, 
invariably from the same ethnic group, who held common attitudes and beliefs and which 
constituted an intense and rigid collective conscience invariably reinforced by sacred 
religious belief (Durkheim, 1915). In such a homogenous, undifferentiated society, anti–
social, deviant – or simply individual or innovative - acts offend the strong cohesiveness and 
social conscience of the people and perform the important function of delineating the 
boundaries between those who wholeheartedly support societal values and those who 
transgress. Repressive and summary punishments are used against those that transgress 
against the collective will and in this way commitment to the moral consensus - or worldview 
- of the group is encouraged with the downside of severely restricting any potential for social 
progress.  
 
Durkheim notes that with greater industrialisation, societies develop greater diversity and 
complexity - stimulated by an essential division of labour - where different groups are 
inevitably interdependent on each other and are now bound together by an organic solidarity 
that relies less on the maintenance of uniformity and similarity between individuals but more 
on the management of the diverse functions of different groups. This is considered a 
progressive phenomenon. A more diverse society produces not an inevitable disintegration of 
morality but the appearance of a new form of the collective conscience where individuals and 
groups are - in the ideal, and probably never achieved conceptualisation of this theory, 
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regardless of differences in appearance, sexual preference and belief - bound together 
through a set of reciprocal obligations. 
 
For Durkheim, there are two fundamental reasons why deviant behaviour occurs in more 
complex societies and both involve a pathological deviation from the ideal state or division 
of labour. First, such societies encourage a state of unbridled ‘egoism’ – or the pursuit of 
individual interest and invariably greed – contrary to the maintenance of collective social 
solidarity and commitment to the laws or rules of that society. Second, there is a greater 
likelihood of inefficient regulation at a time of rapid modernisation with new forms of 
control insufficiently developed to replace now outmoded means of maintaining solidarity. 
The outcome is an abnormal - or chronically unequal - division of labour where society is 
unable to successfully arbitrate between the interests and dealings of different social groups 
in their competition for limited resources; consequently there is a fundamental undermining 
of social justice and citizenship. Groups compete for numerous welfare resources such as 
social services, housing, welfare benefits, health and education (Faulks, 1998). Competition 
for resources within the labour market may be a particular stimulant of hatred between 
groups on the basis of colour or sexuality.  
 
The classical liberal free-market laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
were deeply abhorrent to Durkheim and the idea that competitive individualism could ever 
become the basis of a civilised order was for him patently absurd (Hopkins Burke, 2002: 
101). He would thus have been distinctly unimpressed with the revival of deregulated free-
market capitalism that came to the fore in many parts of Europe and the USA during the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. Durkheim’s concept of anomie refers to unregulated social 
change at times of rapid socio-economic change – whether this is a period of boom or 
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recession – and thus covers pretty much the past two hundred years of British history. During 
that period very different groups of immigrants have arrived on these shores to compete for 
‘scarce resources’ and have consequently born the brunt of complaint and hatred, from the 
Jews and Irish in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to those from the 
Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent during the 1950s and 1960s, Vietnam in the 1980s, 
Eastern Europe, the Middle- and Far East in more recent times. It was however the Thatcher 
Governments of the 1980s that introduced economic policies that produced an unprecedented 
acceleration in socio-economic change and a state of what we here term hyperanomie. 
 
The growth of entrepreneurial capitalism and de–regulation in the economic sphere with a 
reliance on market forces to determine supply and demand, arguably leads to a secular 
society consisting of egotistical individuals consumed by self interest. Moreover, the profit 
maximising philosophy of capitalism creates unchecked widening gaps between the ‘haves’ 
and ‘have-nots’. The latter become resentful of the former and this provides fertile territory 
for hate motivation. It is a situation acerbated by intensified competition in the employment 
market which can lead to tensions between ethnic groups as traditional white workers see 
‘their’ jobs being taken by ‘immigrants’. 
 
Both Fine (1997) and Weiss (1997) observe a widespread popular consensus among certain 
sections of the population of the USA and UK that unqualified minority workers have 
replaced qualified majority workers because of the effects of ‘positive discrimination’ in the 
labour market. Likewise, job advertisements that state: ‘we are an equal opportunities 
employer and particularly welcome applications from people from ethnic minorities’ are 
often interpreted as ‘whites need not apply’. Perry (2001) cites examples of situations where 
in the USA ‘positive’ or ‘reverse’ discrimination has provided a motive and rationale for 
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 13
harassment and assaults on minority workers. Violence motivated by employment 
inequalities provides the perpetrator with an opportunity to publicly announce their 
indignation at the labour market and demand a ‘right to work.’ 
 
Durkheim had sought to eradicate the unequal division of labour and re-create the ‘moral 
constitution’ of the ideal organic society where it possible to manage ethnic and religious 
heterogeneities. During the latter part of the twentieth century, no society has been so 
publicly renowned for its inability to manage its heterogeneities than Northern Ireland 
(although South Africa before the end of Apartheid, Israel/Palestine and even, more 
controversially, the USA, are other powerful examples). At a macro level, organic society in 
Northern Ireland consists of two separate and invariably politically opposed ‘mechanical 
solidarities’ - one Loyalist (to Britain) and Protestant, the other Republican (and 
predominantly pro Eire) and Roman Catholic - inhabiting one ‘shared’ land-space. Within 
these two groups there exists at a local level, ‘terrorist’ organisations that derive their 
membership from predominantly working class individuals within both communities and 
which constitute their own - what we here term - micro-mechanical solidarities. The political 
peace process that has evolved in the province in recent years - as epitomised by the Good 
Friday Agreement - is an attempt to develop and manage an organic solidarity based on a fair 
division of society bringing together the various political and religious groups with very 
different agendas. 
 
Thus, the concept of organic solidarity still provides a useful explanatory instrument for the 
understanding and management of contemporary multi-diverse societies. Indeed, many - if 
not most - individuals within such societies accept and even appreciate such diversity and 
difference. The changing nature of British society is epitomised by the reality that Indian 
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restaurants - virtually unknown in Britain before the 1970s - had by the end of the twentieth 
century a higher turnover than those previously dominant industries of coal, steel and 
shipbuilding combined (Hopkins Burke, 1998).  
 
Acceptance of multi-diversity is nonetheless far from total in society and evidence is 
available from the incidence of minority group members who suffer psychiatric problems 
because of the hostility they encounter; suffering loss of self confidence, coming to question 
their self-worth and developing feelings of isolation (Herek and Berrill, 1992; Janoff-
Bulman, 1992). It is a situation that could lead to what Durkheim (1952, originally 1897) 
describes as ‘egotistic suicide’, which occurs when individuals become dislocated from 
meaningful social support. Members of minority groups are particularly at risk when isolated, 
stigmatised as deviant and excluded from the overwhelming mechanical solidarity, which 
surrounds them. ‘Anomic’ suicide on the other hand can occur in response to the major 
changes in economic conditions described above - and which members of minority groups 
are particularly vulnerable - and which some individuals may have difficulty in coping with. 
A third category of ‘altruistic’ suicide can occur when an individual is so over–integrated 
into a group that - in the case of what we here term ultra-mechanical solidarity - any sense of 
individual identity is subsumed. This could be legitimately used to explain suicide-
terrorists/freedom fighters driven to commit acts of terror because of both a deeply absorbed 
commitment to their own mechanical solidarity and an overwhelming hatred of their 
perceived oppressor. At a more micro level this level of commitment to the group can be 
usefully used to at least partially explain involvement in football hooliganism and skinhead 
racism.  
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It is clear from our discussion that even in a complex post- industrial society characterised by 
high levels of organic solidarity - and multifarious interdependencies - the concept of 
mechanical solidarity retains considerable explanatory power. Within complex and diverse 
worlds, mechanical solidarities continue to significantly exist at three levels in the social 
world. First, there is the macro societal level of national identities that may be particularly 
strong in those societies where the collective conscience is rigidly enforced by reference to a 
fundamentalist religious or political belief system. Second, there is the mezzo or intermediate 
level of the organisation and institution, for example the police, and organised hate groups. 
Third, there is the micro level of the small group or gang, such as a ‘football firm’ in Britain 
or Europe’7 or localised less organised hate groupings. 
 
Many contemporary hate groups have philosophies based on the notion of a collective 
society, consisting of common values, culture, identity, attitude and homogeneity. Those who 
deviate - or are in some way different from the norm - are defined and labelled as being 
deviant and outsiders. Deviance, is a necessary function of any mechanical society – whether 
it be at the macro, mezzo or micro level – inhabited by hate groups because its existence and 
endurance tests the boundaries of tolerance leading to an ongoing evaluation of prevailing 
norms and values. Transgressors against that dominant worldview are oppressed by its 
adherents, ‘subaltern’ (Perry, 2001) or subordinate groups.8 Those that deviate from the rigid 
identities constructed by these groups - whether it is because of their ethnicity, sexuality, or 
gender - are perceived to have contravened the white heterogeneous social order of a 
mechanical society and are consequently rebuked.  
                                                 
7 Gangs of predominantly young males associated with ‘support’ for particular professional football clubs who 
engage in acts of violence against likeminded groups linked to other clubs. 
8 Subaltern groups are comprised of individuals whose sexual, racial, gendered, or ethnic, identities are different 
to the traditional white, male, heterosexual identity that exist in a ’normal’ society. A so-called ‘normal’ or 
mainstream society or ‘normal’ identity is one which is socially constructed by such white, heterosexual, males. 
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There are two prominent rationales for imposing law and punishment in a mechanical 
society; to re- instate or reintegrate the individual back into the collective, while at the same 
time, expressing the abhorrence of deviant acts to the rest of society. Hate groups seem to 
make use of two prevalent forms of punishment to assert their displeasure at deviant 
activities; threats and acts of violence to a person or their property, and verbal victimisation. 
These are considered necessary by the perpetrators for the maintenance of racial difference 
and many ethnic groups believe that they will not survive as a distinctive group if they do not 
conform to white dominated standards of behaviour (hooks: 1995). The extent to which the 
administered punishment is likely to meet with success is problematic. From what we can 
deduce from the psychology-based literature, homosexuals cannot simply ‘change’ their 
sexuality and become heterosexual and thus conform to the ideal of a heterosexua l 
mechanical society (see Ashworth: 2000). It is even less possible for persons of a different 
ethnicity to change their identity and thus conform to the homogeneous heterosexual, white 
mechanical society. Therefore, to publicise difference, intimidate, humiliate and scare, must 
be the only rationales for punishing individuals from a different ethnicity with the apparent 
ultimate motivation of exclusion from that society altogether.  
 
Ben Bowling (1993) observes that hate crime should not be seen as a single, static, or fixed 
event that occurs in a social vacuum, but rather as a social and dynamic process occurring 
within a state of constant social change. Thus, hate crime is inclined to change as the cultural 
identity of a nation and its demographics are transformed (Perry: 2001). In such a scenario, 
racial and ethnic minority groups – or mechanical solidarities - mobilise and demand a place 
and voice in the society that represents their identity. During the latter two decades of the 
twentieth century, US national identity experienced a dramatic change as immigration 
patterns reshaped the demographics of the country. It has been estimated that by the year 
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2050, white people will constitute a minority of the population (ibid). Black Nationalism in 
the West has a strong cultural character. Many Black people in the USA are descendants of 
slaves and have been raised in a culture that emphasised their inferiority. Therefore, for 
Black people to overcome the negative stereotype that was the legacy of slavery, it became 
necessary for some to look beyond the white culture in which they were raised and 
rediscover their cultural roots in Africa. (Heywood: 1992). 
 
The Jamaican political ideologist and activist Marcus Garvey argued that Black people in the 
USA and the Caribbean should look upon Africa as their homeland. Furthermore, he 
advocated social solidarity for all Blacks on the grounds of race and encouraged segregation 
from whites, thereby developing their own form of macro mechanical solidarity. The ideas of 
Garvey inspired the founders of Rastafarianism - a new religion that, from there on in, was to 
be associated with Black Jamaican and Caribbean culture. The followers of Rastafarianism 
became known colloquially as ‘Rastas’ and regarded white society as the corrupt Babylon 
(Heywood: 1992). Whether or not Rastafarianism can really be considered a religion in the 
strictest sense of the word remains a matter of academic debate, it does nonetheless constitute 
the focus of collective Black-African identity. Moreover, in recent years such ‘means of 
cultural identification’ have been ‘exported’ to - and inspired solidarity - in virtually all 
countries of the Western, and the Westernised, world. This fusion of identities has helped 
facilitate and accentuate the fragmentation of the dominant macro mechanical solidarity in 
those countries, and encouraged the acceleration of diversity and organic society, 
notwithstanding that this process has managed to fuel antagonism among other micro-
mechanical solidarities such as skinhead racists and at a more macro level the current Home 
Secretary, David Blunkett’s, recent observations about asylum seekers swamping British 
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society has not helped facilitate a transition to the ideal division of labour sought by 
Durkheim.  
 
This situation whereby a number of mezzo and micro mechanical societies co-exist alongside 
each other in the same geographical space provides a fertile enabling environment for racist 
hate as a sense of insecurity and uncertainty can arise among at least certain sections of the 
traditional white majority. Both Enoch Powell (in Britain) and Jean Marie Le Penn (in 
France) successfully tuned in to the political opportunities proffered by this insecurity and 
dissent during the latter decades of the twentieth century by claiming that that non-white 
immigration would pose a threat to tradition, culture and opportunity for the traditional 
‘white’ community (Heywood: 1992). Thus, hate crime perpetrators motivated by fears of 
cultural change, construct themselves as victims and demand first class preferential 
citizenship as they feel alienated from their traditional community. 
 
Conclusions 
We have shown that Durkheim’s ideas on the constitution of social solidarity and the nature 
of social change provide fertile grounds for locating the origins and transmission of hate 
crime in the structure of society. Contemporary complex and diverse societies tend to be far 
from the ideal divisions of labour that Durkheim sought but are constituted of many different 
competing, invariably unequal and often antagonistic mechanical solidarities at different 
levels of the social world. His fundamental notion that the anomic condition is inexorably 
linked to socio-economic disruption and increases in deviant behaviour has been developed 
by Robert Merton and his successors in the USA and this tradition itself provides further 
powerful explanatory tools in understanding hate crime motivation. 
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THE US ANOMIE TRADITION 
Robert Merton and Anomie Theory 
The US anomie tradition has its origins in the work of Robert Merton (1938) who developed 
the notion of societal fragmentation and unequal competition for scarce resources found in 
the work of Durkheim by observing that while status in US society is founded on the 
dominant goal of achieving material success, there is - in a hierarchically structured racially 
segregated society - unequal access to the legitimate means by which this desired goal can be 
achieved. This is a significant theoretical development because as Levin and McDevitt 
(1993) and Perry (2001) have observed there is a tendency for hate crime offenders to blame 
their economic instability or lack of job opportunities on the immigration of ‘foreigners’. It is 
these blocked opportunities or the under achievement of goals that Merton describes as 
‘anomie.’ He proposes five possible anomic reactions or adaptations – conformity, ritualism, 
retreatism, innovation and rebellion - that can occur when people are not in a position to 
legitimately attain these internalised societal goals and we have here modified his concepts to 
the specific task of explaining hate crime motivation. 
 
Conformity 
The first anomic reaction conformity is where Merton observes that individuals continue to 
strive for material wealth through legitimate means even if their opportunities are constantly 
thwarted. At first sight this adaptation might appear non problematic in the hate crime 
motivation context. Nevertheless, central to the whole notion of conformity is the sense that 
adherents in some way buy into the legitimacy of the whole social order. Exactly why they 
do this is not questioned by Merton but adherence to the law, the influence of macro or 
localised ‘correct’ thinking, perhaps in the work context in the case of the latter, and a lack of 
opportunity could all be legitimate reasons why a person with latent hate crime motivation 
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keeps this under control. In that case the three dimensions of intervention against hate crime 
– legal, situational crime prevention and social crime prevention – have been effective in 
crime reduction. For some this is a satisfactory outcome. An ethnic minority colleague of 
ours recently summed up this apparent contemporary race-relations orthodoxy by observing 
that ‘if they aren’t saying it and they aren’t doing it then that’s ok’. But is it ok? These 
dimensions of intervention do not eradicate hatred itself, and the colleague had undoubtedly 
also seen the look in their eyes which betrayed their real thoughts. It could well be that as an 
outcome of a change in structural circumstances - for example, the arrival of a group of 
immigrants or asylum seekers in the locality, the chance meeting of a new friend or colleague 
with similar latent views, perhaps while on holiday or after the consumption of a few ‘social’ 
drinks, or as the outcome of surfing the Internet – that latent hate crime motivation could 
well be transformed into something more insidious. 
 
These observations nonetheless presume a fundamental premise that hate crime motivation is 
essentially a pathological deviation from societal norms. We argue in this paper the converse; 
hate crime motivation is simply normal and unremarkable in society as currently constituted. 
The powerful macro, mezzo and micro mechanical solidarities identified above that exist in 
even the most complex contemporary organic societies - absorbed and internalised during a 
socialisation process that may well have prioritised notions of hard work, law-abiding 
behaviour and indeed conformity to the group – legitimate hate motivation as normal. Given 
the opportunity in the right venue among ‘our own kind’ where such views are very much the 
norm it is possible that latent hate motivation might well be actualised; where the at least 
tacit approval of the (perhaps) silent majority of conformists might provide succour, support 
and legitimisation for those prepared to act upon their hate motivation, a notion that is further 
explored below. Thus, conformity can be problematic in the hate crime motivation context. 
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Ritualism 
Ritualism is a second anomic reaction that has many similarities with conformism. Merton 
explains that those – such as bureaucrats - who often uncritically adhere to the rules of their 
organisations provide the classic example. Indeed, it might well be this particular group of 
people overly socialised into the ultra mezzo mechanical solidarity of their organisation and 
its values who are most at risk of attraction to political groups seeking to restore a bye-gone 
world of monocultural dominance. Theodore Adorno (1969) provides an excellent example 
of the potential actualisation of latent hate motivation among ritualists at the macro level in 
his classic social-psychological study of the German lower-middle class during the early 
1930s. He shows that the enthusiasm of this group for strong leadership, unequivocal rules 
and discipline – what he terms the ‘authoritarian personality’ – made the political programme 
of the Nationalist Socialists particularly attractive.  
 
Retreatism 
A third anomic reaction - retreatism – is where individuals reject both social goals and the 
means of obtaining them. For Merton, this is a category of social ‘drop-outs’ including 
among others drug addicts, psychotics, vagrants, tramps and chronic alcoholics. Those 
members of the supposedly ‘dominant’ ethnic group in society who have failed to come to 
terms with their inability to access the ‘good life’ through legitimate means and have lapsed 
into a retreatist social location may well carry - or be at risk of - resentments towards those 
they consider to be aliens, for example, groups of immigrants or asylum seekers who have 
achieved access to material success, albeit, in the guise of welfare benefits and preferential 
access to social housing.  
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Innovation 
Innovation – a fourth anomic adaptation - is where the initial goal of material wealth is 
accepted but there is a dearth of legitimate means by which to achieve it. The individual thus 
embarks upon innovative and sometimes illegal or harmful routes in the hope of gaining such 
success. Thus, hate strategies can be used by those groups excluded from access to material 
resources against those who they consider to have achieved these illegitimately. During the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, religious tensions in Northern Ireland undoubtedly 
contributed to innovative anomic adaptations as an outcome of unequal competition for 
scarce resources in the labour market; the minority Catholic population significantly 
underrepresented in the workforce because of the policies of both employers and the 
Protestant dominated trade unions (Tonge, 1997).  
 
Young (1995) has observed that minority ethnic groups predominantly experience 
exploitation in a segmented labour market that reserves skilled highly paid, unionised jobs 
for whites, and menial work for non-whites. Both Young and Perry (2001) observe this 
marginalisation to be the most dangerous form of oppression. The latter argues that whilst 
the acquisition of social rights by racial minorities represents a threat to white cultural 
identity, their economic gains represent a direct threat to white economic security; the former 
observes that economic marginalisation – or the exclusion from the labour market of 
particular social groups – leads to severe material deprivation, economic inequality, and 
powerlessness. In their study of the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham, Rex and Moore (1967) 
found that marginalisation of immigrant groups in the housing market had the same social 
exclusion consequences. Ethnic minorities resided in streets littered with broken bricks and 
glass, and resided in dwellings that had crumbling facades and paint peeling from the walls.  
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Those members of ethnic minorities who do manage to overcome the numerous obstacles 
confronting them and ascend the economic ladder are perceived as unfair competitors and the 
takers of white jobs who have overstepped pre-constructed economic boundaries. The Aryan 
group ALPHA claims that ‘historically, white men and their capabilities have made every 
…advancement and breakthrough possible’ (Perry, 2001: 146). Such groups claim that ethnic 
minority groups do not deserve to prosper, gain rewards, or compete on the same level with 
the more intelligent, morally sound and advanced white race. Any attempt made by a non-
white to increase their employment opportunities in society is seen as detrimental to the 
traditional white American because it removes an opportunity for them.  
 
Support for notions of ethnic minority inferiority and the illegitimacy of their claims to 
economic parity can often come from credible and apparently respectable sources. At the 
time of writing the widely popular – now former - BBC presenter Robert Kilroy-Silk has 
been removed from the screen following his comments in a Sunday newspaper that Arabs are 
nothing but ‘suicide bombers, limb amputators and women repressors’ who have made no 
significant contribution whatsoever to the development of humanity (BBC News, 2004).  
 
Rebellion 
The fifth anomic reaction - rebellion – is where people not merely reject but also wish to 
change the existing social system and its goals. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism 
throughout the world might itself be seen as an example of a growing anomic rebellion 
against the dominant global capitalist world order and its culture. Iran provides an example 
of a previously secular pro-capitalist state that has subsequently undergone a fundamentalist 
Islamic revolution with others such as Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria and post-
war Iraq all having very strong fundamentalist oppositions. Despite being credited as the 
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second largest religion in the world, Islam is more than a mere religion; it is a way of life for 
over 750,000,000 Muslims in more than 70 countries world-wide. Historically, there has 
been constant conflict between Islam and the political and economic ideology of the West 
and undoubtedly, the vast contemporary support it enjoys constitutes a significant threat to 
Western ideologies throughout the world. In particular, fundamentalist Islam has posed a 
threat to much of Europe and America - and more recently the old Soviet-bloc and China - 
primarily because the industrial and technological revolutions which have led to the 
economic and political dominance of the West are contrary to the teachings of the ‘Koran’; 
the final word of God that dictates Islam will inherit the earth and all secular power 
(Heywood, 1992: 164).  
 
The Enduring Influence Of Merton 
Merton’s concept of anomic reaction or adaptation to an inability to gain legitimate access to 
economic resources has - despite criticisms of his apparent over-determinism and 
functionalism that in our view can be overcome (as in the case of Durkheim above) by the 
adoption of a methodological individualist perspective which recognises individual rational 
choice, albeit in many cases constrained by considerable structural limitations placed on that 
choice – has been considerably influential and both adopted and adapted by subsequent 
theorists. We again modify their theoretical contributions to the purpose of explaining hate 
crime motivation. 
 
A significant contribution to the US anomie tradition is provided by  ‘differential association’ 
– a social learning theory first devised by Edwin Sutherland (1939, 1947) - where it is 
proposed that a person is more likely to offend if they have frequent and consistent contact 
with others involved in such activities. Akers (1992) argues that this social learning process 
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usefully explains the link between social structural conditions and individual behaviours. 
Thus, the anomic social conditions (in the Durkheimian sense) and economic inequality that 
have all been linked with deviant behaviour affect the differential associations, definitions, 
models and reinforcements of the individual. The notion of differential association was 
brought together with the concept of anomic reaction by the early US deviant subcultural 
theorists and is particularly useful for explaining both the creation of hate crime motivation 
and its transmission at the micro level. 
 
Early US Deviant Sub-cultural Theorists 
The deviant sub-cultural tradition that emerged during the mid-1950s in the USA – with its 
foundations deeply steeped in the Mertonian anomie tradition - was devised and developed 
by various theorists in order to explain predominantly juvenile male offending. The deviancy 
subculture concept is nevertheless a useful one for explaining behaviour (not necessarily of a 
criminal kind) that has been usefully applied to other areas of the social world, not least that 
of corporate, or business, crime (see Aubert, 1952; Geis, 1967; Faberman, 1975; Braithwaite, 
1984)9 and which we later use to discuss the behaviour of contemporary police officers. It is 
our purpose here, to adapt that tradition to our discussion of hate crime motivation. It will 
nonetheless be necessary in discussing the development of this theoretical tradition to make 
reference to the substantive research interests - in deviant working class young males - of the 
various theorists. We are well aware that hate motivation is not the sole preserve of this 
group and that it is indeed prevalent throughout the social world, although it may well be the 
case that different social classes and groups actualise their hate in different ways. The key 
value in discussing the work of these theorists is show how individual people come together 
and coalesce in likeminded groups. 
                                                 
9 See Hopkins Burke 2001 for a full overview. 
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Thus, it was Albert Cohen (1955) who initiated this tradition by recognising that many young 
people offend not necessarily to obtain economic reward, although they might steal for fun,  
but predominantly to acquire status among their contemporaries by developing a reputation 
for being tough and 'hard',10 in the more contemporary parlance, having ‘an attitude’. It is the 
juvenile gang, or subculture – and their worldview – that is seen to be particularly welcoming 
to the young person offering possibilities for status and belonging denied elsewhere in a 
world dominated by alien middle-class values in which they cannot excel. For Miller (1958) 
it is the very nature of this tradition - with its focal concerns of toughness, smartness, 
excitement, fate and autonomy – that leads certain groups of young to get in trouble with the 
authorities.11  
There is little doubt that this early US deviant sub-cultural tradition provides a useful account 
of how young people from disadvantaged social backgrounds become alienated from 
mainstream middle-class society and its goals and develop their own sub-cultural responses 
which privilege resources of physical toughness, being streetwise and a collective identity 
focusing on shared knowledge and skills which set them apart from others. Being part of a 
particular ethnic group with its additional transmitted traditions and mechanical solidarities 
can undoubtedly act as a particular focus for collective belonging and can undoubtedly 
provide both the fulcrum for the actualisation of hate crime behaviour and protection against 
it.  
Simple empirical observation suggests that these processes usually associated with the study 
of working class youth offending are applicable in the study of groups throughout the social 
world. It is indeed a particularly useful theoretical tool for helping to explain the kind of 
                                                 
10 Cohen was writing in the probably more innocent 1950s. We might note that much contemporary youth offending is 
economically motivated in the pursuit of addictive drugs (see Bennett et al, 2001).     
11 Other subcultural theorists working in this early  US tradition have developed this explanatory approach in an increasingly 
sophisticated fashion. For example, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) have developed a combination of anomie theory and differential 
association theory to devise an ‘illegitimate opportunity structure’ in contrast to Merton’s ‘legitimate opportunity structure’. While, 
this work clearly has some significance for the development of our argument, it is not here deemed central to the project . 
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institutional racist police behaviour identified in the London Metropolitan Constabulary by 
the Macpherson Report 1999. 
 
There has long been a tough working class police culture – ‘canteen culture’ as it has been 
termed (see Holdaway, 1983; Fielding, 1988; Reiner, 2000) – that has been transmitted and 
adapted to changing circumstances across the generations. Working in a hard, tough 
environment invariably at risk of serious violence, notions of always looking after your 
colleagues in the face of external censure and from senior management have made 
considerable sense to serving officers brought together in a perceived shared adversity and 
has rather inevitably led to them looking inwards to the group for a supportive shared 
worldview. The outcome has been a ‘stereotyping’, separating and labelling of the public into 
categories deemed worthy of police assistance – the community or ‘those like us’ – and the 
‘others’, the ‘toe-rags’, ‘slags’, ‘scrotes’, ‘scum’ and ‘animals’. Some have argued that these 
stereotypes drive the day-to-day nature and pattern of police work (Smith and Gray, 1985; 
Young, 1991, 1993) and the Macpherson Report 1999 clearly identified a significant issue of 
institutional racism within the Metropolitan police where young black males were apparently 
not deemed worthy of victim status even when murdered.  
 
Hopkins Burke (2004) observes that this subculture was undoubtedly relatively non 
problematic during an era when police intervention against the rougher elements of a 
predominantly white monocultural working class had undoubted support from most elements 
of society including essentially the socially aspiring respectable elements within that class 
who lived cheek-by-jowl with the roughs and sought protection from them. It was with the 
fragmentation of that society and the emergence of ethnic and sexual preference diversity 
that this macho-police occupational culture became increasingly problematic. 
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This early US deviant sub-cultural tradition has been widely accused of being overly 
determinist in its apparent rejection of free-will and in this variant of the predestined actor 
model (Hopkins Burke, 2001) deviants are seen to be not only different from non deviants 
but in some way committed to an alternative ‘ethical’ code that makes involvement in 
deviant activity appear somewhat mandatory. While it is extremely likely that some young 
people, or police officers for that matter, are so strongly socialised into the mores of a 
particular world view – or mechanical solidarity - through membership of a particular ethnic 
group, the upbringing of their parents and the reinforcing influences of neighbourhood 
groups or gangs that they do not challenge this heritage in any way, it also likely that many 
others have less consistent socialisation experiences and have a far more tangential 
relationship to such deviant behaviour, although they may be at considerable risk of being 
drawn into a far deeper involvement.  
 
We have twice above – in our discussion of the work of Durkheim and Merton – drawn 
attention to our methodological individualist reinterpretation of those significant sociologists 
whereby we recognise that human beings do have - albeit bounded - rational choices, but 
invariably in circumstances where their activities are constrained by sometimes considerable 
structural factors. It is the work of David Matza (1964) that provides both a complementary 
non determinist account but also an illuminating explanatory framework extremely useful for 
explaining peripheral commitment to hate crime motivation at the micro level and how this 
might – in the right enabling circumstances – develop into something more enduring.  
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David Matza, Delinquency and Drift 
Matza (1964) significantly observed the inability of the overly-determinist US deviant 
subcultural tradition to explain why it is that most young offenders ‘grow out’ of offending 
behaviour.12 He proposed that offending behaviour is simply a status and delinquents are role 
players who intermittently act out a delinquent role. They simply ‘drift’ between deviant and 
conventional behaviour, are neither compelled nor committed to delinquent activity but 
freely choose it some times and not at others. Moreover, they can remain within the 
‘subculture of delinquency’ – or we might speculate here, an enabling and legitimating hate 
crime discourse or micro mechanical solidarity -without actually taking part in offending 
behaviour. This thesis is clearly useful in helping to explain tangential, non-committed – or 
the simply growing out of - hate crime motivation. 
 
Matza proposed that adolescent males go through three stages in a process of becoming 
deviant. The first stage is when he is in the company of other young males and where there 
appears to be an ‘ideology of delinquency’ implicit in their actions and remarks. In these 
circumstances he is motivated by his anxiety to be accepted as a member of the group and 
learn the ‘correct’ form of behaviour and attitudes necessary for acceptance. He therefore 
steals things, vandalises, hits people, racially abuses people not because he ‘really’ wants to 
but because he feels he ‘ought’ to and this apparently endears him to the group. What he fails 
to realise is that others in the group feel exactly the same as he does. It is when two or more 
young men confess to each other that they do not like this behaviour – and to do this, we 
might observe here, they have to non-conform to the values of the group (Merton) or 
challenge the moral boundaries of the collective conscience (Durkheim) - a particular 
                                                 
12 All the evidence suggests that the ‘growing up’ also means growing out of crime (Rutherford, 1992). Self-report 
studies show that anywhere between 50-90% of young people admit to having committed – albeit in most cases minor 
- criminal offences. A much smaller proportion of young people, somewhere between 3-4%, persist in – at least 
serious manifestations of - this behaviour into adulthood (Graham and Bowling, 1995; Hopkins Burke, 1999). 
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individual reaches a stage of development where he no- longer needs the status and security 
of the group and thus decides to cease involvement in such deviant activity. 
 
The second stage occurs when other young males - having overcome their initial socialisation 
that has taught them not to be deviant 13 - develop extenuating circumstances or ‘techniques 
of neutralisation’ to justify their deviant behaviour. Matza identifies five major types of 
neutralisation that we have here adapted to the hate crime motivation context: 
 
• denial of responsibility (I didn’t really mean it); 
• denial of injury (I didn’t really harm him, it was just a bit of harmless name-calling, he 
doesn’t really  mind); 
•  denial of the victim (he deserved it, what are they doing over here anyway, this is our 
country); 
• condemnation of the condemners (they come here take our houses, our jobs and our 
women); and  
• appeals to higher loyalties (you’ve got to stand by your own kind, it’s us against them). 
 
These techniques are excuses - and not explanations of deviant behaviour - and it is not 
difficult to envisage how these remarks might be made by social groups other than young 
working class males, although the neutralisation might be articulated rather differently. Thus, 
for example, the following hypothetical type of, rather all inclusive and somewhat 
‘upmarket’, neutralisation might not be completely unfamiliar to some readers: 
 
                                                 
13 We might observe here the opposite, a possible socialised propensity to hate crime motivation learned from 
parents and significant others. 
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Well I know it is rather unpleasant and one doesn’t really like getting involved in these 
things, but they are different from us. They have a different way of life and it is not really 
what we want here. You really wouldn’t want your children to mix with them now would 
you! I don’t really approve of this sort of thing but something has to be done.  
 
Matza argues that at a deeper level there is a commitment to ‘subterranean values’, which – 
like ‘focal concerns’ (Miller), conscience collective (Durkheim), or conformist values 
(Merton) – exist in the wider culture of normal society. While Matza emphasises the search 
for excitement that deviant behaviour brings it seems extremely likely that racist and sexual 
preference notions are commonplace in many local micro-mechanical solidarities and these 
are simply learned from parents and peers. 
 
Matza provides a theoretical link with the social reaction or labelling theories that were at 
that time coming to the fore in the USA (see Lemert, 1951; Becker, 1963) and argues that the 
operation of the criminal justice system might actually convince young people that deviant 
behaviour does not really matter - even though they are punished or treated – and that they 
are quick to exploit this recognition in their own defence. We might observe that this process 
of self- justification in the hate motivation context can be reinforced further by those (and not 
always so subterranean) values to be found at the macro level. During the 1980s hooligan 
elements following English football teams in Europe - including the national team - were 
heavily involved in violence against overseas fans. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was 
virulently opposed to these actions and instigated a number of assertive measures. Many of 
the hooligans – noting both her enthusiasm for engaging in war against Argentina and verbal 
assaults on other countries in the European Union - nonetheless considered her to be secretly 
proud of them. Absurd as this viewpoint might seem it was given some credence by the 
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revelation that a - albeit idiosyncratic - government minister, Alan Clark, actually suggested 
that we should be proud of these young men fighting for their country (Williams, 1989).   
 
For Matza, the third stage in a deviant career has now been reached. The young male is in a 
situation of ‘drift’. He knows what is required of him and has learned the techniques of 
neutralisation, which justify his deviant behaviour. On the other hand, he is not automatically 
committed to deviant behaviour but can choose to engage in it when he wishes. It is this 
recognition of ‘free-will’ that distinguishes Matza completely from those working in the 
determinist deviant subculture tradition. From this perspective, the deviant is responsible for 
his behaviour and – although he is well aware that what he is doing is contrary to the law – 
he persists in this behaviour. 
 
Matza’s work explains the persistence of this behaviour in terms of the young person having 
acquired certain skills partly from his older friends and partly from the mass media, and 
particularly, in the contemporary situation, the Internet, which has made involvement in 
criminal behaviour possible, plus his ability to manage guilt in the way described above. It is 
at this stage – we propose - that the person, who does not have to be male, young or working 
class, is much more vulnerable to more than a merely tangential involvement with hate group 
activities. Having absorbed experiences and knowledge at each stage of their socialisation, 
from parents, friends and had these values reinforced by access to media - however self 
selecting this might be - provides the individual with choices which for them are very much 
rational. In a complementary study conducted for the British Home Office, Rae Sibbitt 
(1999) found that the views held by all kinds of race hate perpetrators are shared very much 
by the communities to which they belong. Perpetrators see this as legitimising their actions. 
In turn, the wider community not only spawn such perpetrators, but fails to condemn them 
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and actively reinforce their behaviour. It is this notion that hate crime perpetrators are very 
much part of their local micro subculture that is usefully informed by a later European 
anomie tradition. 
 
THE LATER RADICAL EUROPEAN TRADITION 
 
This later radical European tradition has identifiable foundations in both earlier anomie 
traditions and is particularly useful in helping exp lain the existence and persistence of often 
co-existing different hate crime motivations in complex contemporary fragmented 
communities. We commence with a discussion of the radical neo-Marxist sub-cultural 
theories formulated by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCCS). 
 
The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
Neo-Marxist researchers working at the BCCCS during the 1970s (see Brake, 1985; P. 
Cohen, 1972; S. Cohen, 1973; Hebdige, 1976, 1979) observed that ‘spectacular’ youth sub-
cultures - such as Teddy Boys, Mods, Skinheads and Punks - arise at particular historical 
'moments' as cultural solutions to the same structural economic problems created by rapid 
social change identified by Durkheim – and Merton in a rather different way – as an anomic 
condition.   
 
These researchers recognise that in contemporary societies the major cultural configurations 
– or we might observe, macro mechanical solidarities - are cultures based on social class, but 
within these larger entities are sub-cultures which are defined as ‘smaller, more localised and 
differentiated structures, within one or other of the larger cultural networks’ (Hall and 
Jefferson, 1976: 13). These sub-cultures have different focal concerns than the larger cultural 
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configuration from which it is derived but will share some common aspects or core values 
with the ‘parent culture’. Some, like deviant sub-cultures, are persistent features of the parent 
culture, but others appear only at certain historical moments; then fade away. These latter 
sub-cultures are highly visible and, indeed 'spectacular'. Although their members may well 
look very 'different' from their parents or peers, they will still share the same class position, 
the same life experiences, and generally the same worldview or core values of the parent 
culture. All they are doing, through their distinctive dress, life style, music etc., is producing 
a different cultural 'solution' to the problems posed for them by their material and social class 
position and experience. They are invariably articulating a contemporary variant of the parent 
culture that is in accord with their changed socio-economic circumstances. 
 
The central concern of that collection of studies was to locate the historical and 
environmental context in which particular youth sub-cultures arose and the details of 'style' 
adopted by these. Central to their argument is the notion that style is a form of resistance to 
subordination which is essentially ritualistic, symbolic or magical as it is not, actually, a 
successful solution to the problem of subordination. Resistance is not a desperate 'lashing out' 
or a passive adaptation to an anomic situation of disjunction, but a collective response 
designed to resist or transform dominant values and defend or recapture working class or 
ethnic group values - to win space, to reclaim community and reassert traditional values. This 
resistance is nonetheless deemed to be symbolic rather than real.   
 
Stan Cohen (1973) notes three contexts in which concepts of ritual, myth, metaphor, magic, 
and allegory are invoked. First, the target for attack is inappropriate or irrational in the sense 
of not being logically connected with the source of the problem. For example, we could 
argue that skinheads beating up Asian and Gay people are in reality reacting to other things, 
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such as, perceived threats to community, homogeneity, or traditional stereotypes of 
masculinity. Second, when the solution does not confront the real material basis of 
subordination and is not a genuinely political response, the activities are seen as merely – 
albeit violent - ‘gestures’. Third, when the sub-cultural style denotes something beyond its 
surface appearance, for example, the boots worn by Skinheads, the young people are making 
oblique coded statements about their relationships to a particular – in that example, white 
working class - past or present. 
 
The BCCCS researchers focused on two broad but overlapping areas: mainstream youth and 
delinquency, especially the transition from school to work and expressive or spectacular 
youth sub-cultures. The two major studies of mainstream youth sub-cultures are those of 
Willis (1977) and Corrigan (1979) and both are concerned with the transition from school to 
work among urban lower working-class adolescent boys. Their 'problem' is an alien or 
irrelevant education system followed by the prospect of a boring and dead end job (or, 
nowadays, training and the benefits queue, see Hopkins Burke, 1999) and the 'solution' is a 
'culture of resistance' manifested in truancy and petty offending. Actions are ritualistic (or 
magical) but they can never solve the problem. Spectacular’ youth sub-cultures involve the 
adoption, by young people of both sexes of a distinctive style of dress and way of using 
material artefacts combined, usually, with distinctive life-styles, behaviour patterns and 
musical preferences. Both variants of subculture invariably involve a contemporary 
manifestation of parent culture values – or in the context of this paper, hate motivations – 
that have been adapted to the changed socio-economic circumstances in which the group 
finds itself.  
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Later researchers have considered the co-existence of different subcultures with their 
foundations in the same parent culture – or macro mechanical solidarity – at a time of 
increased social fragmentation which some social scientists have come to term the 
postmodern condition.   
   
Sub-cultures and the Postmodern Condition 
The CCCS studies represented an important development of the earlier deviant subcultural 
tradition - which had recognised that deviance often occurs in response to economic or status 
deprivation – and identified that particular sub-cultures or status groups have arisen in 
response to the perceived economic problems of distinct groups. Hopkins Burke and Sunley 
(1996, 1998) observe, however, that these studies presume a linear development of history 
where different sub-cultures arise, coalesce, fade and are replaced as economic circumstances 
change. For example, the 'Mods' were a product of the upwardly mobile working-classes 
during the optimistic 1960s (Hebdige, 1976; 1979; Brake, 1980), whereas the Punks were a 
product of the ‘dole-queue’ despondency of the late-1970s (Hebdige, 1979; Brake, 1980; 
1985). More recently the co-existence of a number of different sub-cultures expressing rather 
different worldviews has been identified. 
 
Hopkins Burke and Sunley (1996, 1998) propose this co-existence to be the outcome of a 
fragmented society where specific groups of young people have coalesced to create solutions 
to their specific socio-economic problems. Central to this account is the possibility of choice. 
The simultaneous existence of different sub-cultures enables some young people to choose 
the solution to their problem from the various sub-cultures available although that choice will 
undoubtedly be constrained by structural factors. 
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The early deviant sub-cultural studies - and indeed the work of the Birmingham School - 
tended to suggest that young people had limited choices, if any, between the sub-culture in 
existence at a particular time and in that geographical space, and a life of conventionality. A 
postmodernist interpretation of youth subcultures enables us to recognise that individuals, 
and different groups of young people, not all members of the  traditional working-class but in 
existence concurrently at the same historical moment, have had very different experiences of 
the radical economic change that has engulfed British society since the late 1970s. These 
very different groups have developed their own sub-cultural solutions for coping with this 
transformation. 
 
Hopkins Burke and Sunley (1996, 1998) observe a wide variety of youth sub-cultures in 
existence in Britain in the 1990s. Two of those subcultures particularly relevant to our 
discussion of hate crime motivation are football hooligans and the ‘new racists’.14 Football 
hooliganism – as observed above - has been a serious issue since the 1970s when virtually 
every professional football match played in Britain was marred by crowd disorder and 
violence. Since the publication of the Taylor Report in 1990 there has been nonetheless a 
substantial reduction in the size and nature of the phenomenon with an increasing transition 
from a predominantly mass male white working-class spectator sport to a predominantly 
affluent middle-class family-based spectatorate watching working-class gladiators; mirroring 
developments in professional sport in the USA (see Carver et al., 1995).  
 Sporadic acts of violence continue at professional football matches, and rather more 
incidents occur away from the actual stadiums where the policing of large numbers of people 
                                                 
14 This is not to say that other sub-cultural configurations do not share worldviews that make them highly susceptible to hate crime 
motivation. Hopkins Burke and Sunley (1996, 1998) observe that very different subcultural ‘solutions’ can be categorised in two 
broad distinctive strands. The first strand involves a nostalgic look backward to times past when a romanticised and caricatured 
white working-class took pride in its place in a GREAT Britain and follows in the tradition established by Teddy Boys in the 1950s 
(Jefferson, 1976) and Skinheads in the 1970s (Hebdige, 1979). The second strand involves a look forward and discussions of 
environmental issues and gender politics. Many interesting coalitions have developed between different sub-cultural groupings, but 
in general these can be located in the context of one of the two broader strands.  
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is far more problematic. Nonetheless, all the evidence points to a substantial decrease in the 
numbers involved. At the same time, there has been a quantitative decline there has been an 
increase in the qualitative seriousness of the phenomenon. Football grounds became popular 
recruiting grounds for far-right political groups such as the British National Party (BNP) who 
have become popular with disaffected working-class youngsters who have clung tenaciously 
to their traditions in the face of spiralling costs. It is ironic that the gentrification of 
professional football has alienated many of its traditional fan-base with some subsequently 
attracted to the simplistic political solutions of the far-right (Williams, 1992; Anti-Fascist 
Action, 1994; Carver et al., 1995). 
 
In recent years there has been a more general revival of interest in extreme right-wing 
political parties among the working class in poor inner-city areas. Racism has long been a 
popular ingredient of particular sub-cultures, for example, Teddy Boys (Jefferson 1976) and 
Skinheads (Hebdige 1979). Indeed, it would be reasonable to suggest that the 'new racists' are 
merely a contemporary political manifestation of these groups. The success of the ultra-right 
British National Party in 1993 in winning a seat on Tower Hamlets Council, an area of 
extreme social deprivation with a large ethnic minority population, alerted us to a new 
manifestation of an old racist problem (Campaign Against Racism and Fascism, 1993). 
Evidence suggests that many people in the area saw their problem as being their inability to 
gain access to local authority housing in an area where their families had lived for 
generations. Perceiving groups of relatively recent immigrants from ethnic minority 
backgrounds to be favoured by the local Labour controlled council, they considered the 
solution to their problem to be support for a political party which would put the interests of 
indigenous white people first (Hopkins Burke and Sunley, 1998)  
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The 'new fascists' are, however, a widespread phenomenon not merely restricted to run-down 
inner city areas with large influxes of non-white immigrants or for that matter young people. 
Close links with the football hooliganism sub-culture were observed above and this pattern of 
recruitment is widespread both internally to Britain but also on an international level. There 
is also evidence, however, that the new fascism is gaining recruits from areas not normally 
associated with overt and organised racism. For example, the British National Party has 
moved the centre of its operations to rural central England and has been particularly 
successful in recruiting among young males traditionally associated with the highly 
organised left-wing trade union dominated coal mining industry damaged to the point of non-
existence as an outcome of Conservative government policies during the 1980s. More 
recently, race riots occurred in the old mill- towns of Oldham and Burnley in Lancashire 
following the election of BNP councillors in Lancashire in recent years. 15  
 
It nevertheless seems most unlikely that the new fascism or racism has emerged and taken 
root in a previously unwelcoming cultural environment. Working-class communities with 
high levels of trade union membership have never been the bastions of anti-racism that their 
more radical activists might like to suggest. Word of mouth and the evidence of our own eyes 
suggest that many of these communities have long been seriously unwelcoming 
environments for non white non heterosexuals. The reality appears that the contemporary 
fragmented social world has brought into contact invariably through interdependent necessity 
a whole range of groups with different origins and va lues, even though many of these might 
be objectively termed working class. The power structure within those configurations also 
appears complex and not easily explained by more traditional structural conceptions of 
power. 
                                                 
15 In 2001, the BNP had electoral success in Lancashire, winning one seat in Blackburn and three in Burnley. In 2003, it had 
further success, winning a seat in Calderdale, West Yorkshire (BBC News, 2003). 
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A Post-Structuralist Conception of Power 
Central to our discussion is a poststructuralist conceptualism of power strongly influenced by 
the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Structuralists had focused their 
attention on the issue of sovereignty and the legitimacy of power, which they saw as a means 
for enhancing the capacities of those who generally possess authority, and who are able to 
impose it upon other persons to infringe their freedoms and choice (Hindess: 1996). From 
that perspective, power is distributed by a sovereign body as a judicial mechanism to limit 
and forbid. The powerlessness of ethnic minorities is an obvious characteristic of racism and 
historically the opportunities of minority groups have been limited in terms of social, 
economic, and political power. Perry (2001) observing this point in the context of the USA 
cites Clarke (1969): 
 
 …invisible walls have been erected by those in the white society who have power; 
both to confine those who have no power and to perpetuate the powerless. In 
addition, to the economic and social powerlessness imposed on minority groups, 
the United States Government has historically imposed political powerlessness 
upon them by enforcing restrictions on their citizenship and its corresponding 
rights. This denial of rights includes limiting their right to free speech, political 
participation, and their freedom of expression. 
 
Foucault (1980) in contrast argues that power is not simply the privilege of the state and - we 
might observe here - dominant macro groups. On the contrary, strategies – and again we 
might observe, relationships - of power are pervasive throughout society and the state is only 
one location of the points of control and resistance. Foucault (1971, 1976) argues that, 
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 41
particular areas of social life - for example, medicine, law, sexuality – have been colonised 
and defined by the norms and control strategies through which a variety of institutions and 
experts devise and abide. These networks of power and control operate at all levels – macro, 
mezzo and micro – of the social world and are governed as much by the knowledge and 
concepts that define them as by any definite intentions of powerful groups at the very highest 
level in society. 
The state, for its part, is implicated in this matrix of power-knowledge, but this is only part of 
it, for in this vein, it has been argued that within civic society there are numerous ‘semi-
autonomous’ realms and relationship - such as communities, occupations, organisations, 
families and personal relationships - where certain kinds of ‘policing’ and ‘order’ are indeed 
present, but where the official agents of the state administration and are technically absent. 
These semi-autonomous arenas within society are often appropriately negotiated and resisted 
by their participants in ways that even now, the state has little or no jurisdiction. 
Thus, from this post-structuralist perspective power in a complex fragmented society exists at 
all levels of the social world with there being a multitude of possibilities as to who actually 
possesses - and who is possessed - by power in these arrangements. Thus, while men can 
have power over women, white people over ethnic minorities, and heterosexuals over gays; 
the situation nonetheless becomes infinitely more complex. Strong men can have power over 
weak men, strong women over weak women and weak men. Black men can have power over 
white women, strong gay men over weak heterosexual men. The possibilities are endless – 
and we might here note the Ali G. 16 syndrome where some white and south Asian working 
class males impersonate black sub-cultural icons to the point of invariably non-self conscious 
caricature - but the crucial word in the previous sentence is can for such power relations only 
                                                 
16 Ali G is a comedy character - created by Sasha Baron Cohen – which rather lampoons this tendency of 
certain white males to dress like Black gangstas and talk in patois. See: www.aligindahouse.msn.co.uk and 
Cohen, (2001). 
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develop when appropriate enabling socio-economic circumstances arise which provide that 
window of opportunity. Hate groups at the mezzo and micro levels in society can take 
advantage of opportunities that come their way and from which they can gain advantage and 
therefore such groups normally considered to be powerless can gain – albeit limited and 
localised – power over other groups who are even less powerful, as the example of BNP 
electoral success demonstrates. Nonetheless, this power can become potentially more 
generalised than that particular example suggests and cent ral to that possibility - in the 
diverse, fragmented world of micro and mezzo mechanical solidarities - is the considerable 
enabling power of contemporary global communication systems. For who living in London 
and South East England in 1969 would have thought that the very localised sub-cultural 
grouping of the time, the ‘skinheads’ with their adherence to a fast declining way of very 
English semi-and-non-skilled working class life (see Cohen, 1972) and a hatred of ‘alien’ 
groups of non-white immigrants would have come to have such an important influence on 
race hate groups throughout the developed world (see Perry, 2001)?  The contemporary 
communications revolution is very much central to these developments. 
  
The Dissemination of Hate and the Communications Revolution 
It is by forming associations with other like-minded individuals, that disseminators of hate 
material can absorb themselves in a world consisting of numerable ‘definitions’ of why it is 
appropriate to act in the way they do. Contemporary communication innovations – in 
particular, the near universality of the world-wide web – have considerably enhanced the 
ability of individuals to form associations over vast distances at times of their choice. The 
ease at which hate groups can be found ‘on-line’ (see Sutton, 2002) enables numerous 
individuals to encounter, and obtain personal contact with groups that may encourage, 
stimulate and substantiate what at the time of access are merely transient and poorly thought 
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out ‘hate’ notions. In this way the individual can become embroiled in the machinery of hate 
group ideology.  
 
Marshall McLuhan (1964: 5) observed during the early 1960s a new era of television global 
communication which he considered an ‘extension of man’ and - although even he could not 
anticipate the possibilities offered forty years later by the virtual universality of the Internet - 
many of the concerns he volunteered about this development at the time are as pertinent now 
as they were then. In particular, there is the recognition that the  growth of electronic 
technology ‘alters the position of the negro and other social groups, whilst some groups can 
no longer be contained’ (ibid). The break out from the ghetto of their localised micro-but-
invariably-ultra-mechanical solidarities has been immensely enhanced by the enabling 
possibilities of the world-wide-web. Quite simply, any little group of racists with the most 
odious views imaginable can bring themselves to the attention of like-minded others 
anywhere on the planet by posting a web presence on the Internet. Bigger more established 
hate groups can bring themselves to the attention to a wider global audience and the 
possibility arises of coalitions between such groups. Certainly, since the 1990s, white 
supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, White Aryan Resistance (in the USA), and the 
British National Party (Britain) have consolidated web sites and newsgroups as a permanent 
feature of their regimes (Back, 2001).  
 
The increasing popularity of personal computers and increasing competitiveness of Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) has greatly facilitated the virtual universality of the medium by the 
provision of cheap, affordable access available anonymously from the comfort and security 
of your home. All of this enables the formation of a ‘cyber-sub-culture’ that has many 
similarities to those discussed above but also with crucial differences. First, there is the 
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possibility of gaining support from a much wider socio-economic base in cyberspace than in 
real-space. Thus, membership of a cyber-subculture does not necessarily constitute the 
archetypal racist or working class subculture member. For example, Richard Miles, who 
played a leading role - and carried out hate activities - in many white supremacist groups, 
including the Ku Klux Clan, was a middle-manager in an insurance company and Richard 
Girnt–Butler, a recent leader of Aryan Nations was an aerospace engineer. (Jones: 1998). 
Second, the Internet dissolves barriers of distance that formerly kept like-minded persons 
apart and allows the individual to develop a sense of intimacy with - and become involved in 
– what we have termed a subculture from a distance. At the same time, a non physical 
presence in cyberspace might well reduce any apprehension individuals might have in taking 
part in the group. It is possible that some individuals attracted to these websites are willing 
participants in these groups at this level but have no wish to become more actively involved 
in the physical world. On the other hand, it seems extremely likely that the converse is true 
and that many individuals who  previously had no access to an illegitimate opportunity 
structure (Cloward and Ohlin, 1961) are now offered one by the Internet and can now 
overcome their initial anxieties by being gently absorbed into the cyber world and 
progressively gaining more confidence and moving forward with their new found associates 
towards becoming actually physically involved in hate group activities;  a process of deviant 
subculture formation that has resonance with both the early US and later European traditions. 
 
Pease (2001) notes that technological developments always lead to new innovations in 
criminal activity and observes that the Internet has changed crime in two distinct ways. First, 
it has facilitated the commission of new crimes, and second, facilitated new ways of 
committing old crimes. Thus, previously localised hate groups have been able to widen their 
recruitment, membership, develop and dissimilate hate materials in a far more sophisticated 
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fashion. With technical development in crime commission, have come nonetheless more 
sophisticated ways of detection, including such measures as psychological profiling that aid 
the police in their hunt for perpetrators of, usually very serious crime. Identifying and 
apprehending offenders of on–line hate crime is nonetheless problematic in the cyber-world 
where offences can all be committed anonymously without fear of identification and 
apprehension. Hate crime is increasingly likely to occur in places of privilege, such as school 
or work. Perpetrators come from all social classes and are not the stereotypical uneducated, 
unemployed criminally motivated person well-known to police investigation or for that 
matter the stereotypical skinhead racist with Nazi tattoos. Back (2001) argues that ‘to 
investigate hate on the net, you must combine the skills of a detective, a lie detector, and 
propaganda code breaker’. He further emphasises the difficulties that Internet criminality 
poses by admitting that much detection is achieved by educated guess work. We argue that 
having a sophisticated understanding of hate crime motivation at all levels of the social world 
is a indispensable aid to that process. 
  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has been founded on the central contention that hate thought, at the very least, is 
perfectly normal and unremarkable - if undesirable - in our society as currently constituted. 
The extended discussion of sociologically informed criminological theories goes someway to 
helping us understand the existence, transmission and continuance of hate thought at the 
macro, mezzo and micro levels of society and how people might – usually with the assistance 
and support of others – come to transform these latent motivations into extremely unpleasant 
actual actions. While legislative interventions have been undoubtedly successful to some 
extent in both punishing offenders and deterring other latent hate crime motivated 
individuals, and while there will be undoubtedly a never ending supply of increasingly 
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sophisticated – and inevitably expensive - technological situationalist solutions to the 
problems posed by actualised motivated perpetrators (with the probably unintended but very 
real consequences of increasing restrictions on all our freedoms) it seems that these measures 
will never successfully eradicate the widespread existence of hate motivation that is 
embedded in the dominant culture (or macro mechanical solidarities) of our society; that is, 
mediated, refined and given legitimacy by institutions where racism may well be endemic 
(mezzo mechanical solidarities); and mutated and adapted to contemporary socio-economic 
conditions through different subcultures or localised groupings (micro mechanical 
solidarities). The cultural aggregate of the transmission of hate ideologies at these three 
societal levels provides a not inconsiderable legitimate basis for individuals from all social 
backgrounds to neutralise any hate motivations or actions they may have. The pervasive 
existence and persistence of these motivations provides a powerful justification for a 
comprehensive educative social intervention at all levels of the social world. What is 
undoubtedly required is the political will to tackle this highly significant issue. It is surely the 
task of hate crime researchers to ally themselves with campaign groups and activists to 
ensure that incidences of hate motivation and action are detected, documented and brought to 
the attention of government so to aid that campaign.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 47
REFERENCES 
 
Adorno, T.W. (1969) The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Norton. 
 
Akers, R.L. (1992) ‘Linking Sociology and Its Specialities’, Social Forces, 71: 1-16. 
 
Anti-Fascist Action (1994) Fighting Talk: Football Special, Issue 9, London: Anti-Fascist 
Action. 
 
Amos, W. and Wellford, C. (eds) (1967) Delinquency Prevention: Theory and Practice, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Ashworth, P. D. (2000) Psychology and Human Nature, Hove: Psychology Press.  
 
Aubert, W. (1952) ‘White Collar Crime and Social Structure’, American Journal of 
Sociology, 58: 263-71. 
 
Back, L (2001) Aryans Reading Adorno: Cyberculture and 21st Century Racism, unpublished 
paper. 
 
Barr, R. and Pease, K. (1992) ‘Crime Displacement to Crime Placement’, in D.J. Evans, N.R. 
Fyfe and D.T. Herbert (eds) Crime, Policing and Place: Essays in Environmental 
Criminology, London: Routledge. 
 
BBC News (2003) BNP takes fifth council seat, [online]. London, Available at: 
URL:http://www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics.htm.  
 
BBC News (2004) Kilroy Defends Arab States, [online]. London, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3386451.stm.  
 
Becker, H. (1963) Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, New York: Free Press. 
 
Begg, D., Fischer, S. and Dornbusch, R. (2003) Economics, Seventh Edn, Maidenhead: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Bennett, T., Holloway, K. and Williams, T. (2001) Drug Use and Offending: Summary Results 
From the First Year of the NEW-ADAM Research Programme, Findings 148, London: Home 
Office. 
 
Boudon, R. (1980) The Crisis in Sociology: Problems of Sociological Epistemology, London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Bowling, B (1999) Violent Racism: Victimisation, Policing and Social Context, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 
 
Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2002) Racism, Crime and Justice, London: Longman. Brake, M. 
(1980) The Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Sub-cultures, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 48
 
Braithwaite, J. (1984) Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, London: Routledge. 
 
Brake, M. (1980) The Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Sub-cultures, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
 
Brake, M. (1985) Comparative Youth Culture, London: Routledge. 
 
Bright, J. (1987) ‘Community Safety, Crime Prevention and the Local Authority’, in P. 
Wilmot (ed.) Policing in the Community, London: Policy Studies Institute. 
 
Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (1993) No. 17, November/December. 
 
Carver, M, Garland, J. and Rowe, M. (1995) Racism, Xenophobia and Football: A Preliminary 
Investigation, Crime, Order and Policing Occasional Paper Series, No 3, Leicester: Scarman 
Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester. 
 
Clarke, K (1969) in B. Perry (2001) In The Name of Hate, London, Routledge. 
 
Clarke, R.V.G. (1987) ‘Rational Choice Theory and Prison Psychology’, in B.J. McGurk and 
R.E. McGurk (eds) Applying Psychology to Imprisonment: Theory and Practice, London: 
HMSO. 
 
Cloward, R.A. and Ohlin, L.E. (1960) Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent 
Gangs, New York: Free Press. 
 
Cohen, A.K. (1955) Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang, New York: Free Press. 
 
Cohen, L.E. and Felson, (1979) ‘Social Inequality and Predatory Criminal Victimization: An 
Exposition and Test of a Formal Theory’, American Sociological Review, 44: 588-608.  
 
Cohen, P. (1972) ‘Sub-Cultural Conflict and Working Class Community’, Working Papers in 
Cultural Studies, No.2, Birmingham: CCCS, University of Birmingham. 
 
Cohen, S. (1973) Folk Devils and Moral Panics, London: Paladin. 
 
Cohen, S.B. (2001) The Gospel According to Ali G, London: Fourth Estate. 
 
Cornish, D. and Clarke, R. (1986) The Reasoning Criminal, New York: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Corrigan, P. (1979) The Smash Street Kids, London: Paladin. 
 
Crawford, A. (1998) Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and 
Practices, Harlow: Longman. 
 
Downes, D. (1966) The Delinquent Solution, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Durkheim, E. (1915) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, London: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Durkheim, E. (1933 originally 1893) The Division of Labour in Society, Glencoe: Free Press. 
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 49
 
Durkheim, E (1952, originally published in 1897), Suicide: A Study in Sociology, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul  
 
Faberman, H.A. (1975) ‘A Criminogenic Market Structure: The Automobile Industry’, 
Sociological Quarterly, 16: 438-57. 
 
Faulks, K (1998) Citizenship in Modern Britain, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Fine, M (1997) in Perry, B (2001) In The Name of Hate, London, Routledge. 
 
Fielding, N. (1988) Joining Forces, London: Routledge. 
 
FB1 (2003) The FB1Lone Wolf Project. http://www.stopthehate.net/index1.htm. 
 
Felson, M. and Clarke, R.V. (1998) Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for 
Crime Prevention, Police Research Series Paper 96, London: Home Office. 
 
Foucault, M. (1971) Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 
London: Tavistock. 
 
Foucault, M. (1976) The History of Sexuality, London: Allen Lane. 
 
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish – the Birth of the Prison, London: Allen Lane. 
 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, (ed.) 
C. Gordon, Brighton Harvester Press. 
 
Geis, G. (1967), ‘The Heavy Electrical Equipment Anti- trust Cases of 1961’, in M.B. Clinard 
and R. Quinney (eds) Criminal Behaviour Systems, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
 
Giddens, A. (2001) Sociology, Fourth Edn, Oxford: Polity Press. 
 
Graham, J. and Bowling, B. (1995) Young People and Crime, Home Office Research Study 
No. 145, London: HMSO. 
 
Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. (eds) (1976) Resistance through Rituals: Youth Sub-cultures in Post-
war Britain, London: Hutchinson. 
 
Hebdige, D. (1976) 'The Meaning of Mod', in S. Hall and T. Jefferson (eds.) Resistance 
Through Rituals: Youth Sub-cultures in Post-war Britain, London: Hutchinson: 118-143. 
 
Hebdige, D. (1979) Subculture: The Meaning Of Style, London: Methuen. 
 
Herek, G. and Berrill, K. (1992), Hate Crimes: Confronting Lesbians and Gay Men, London: 
Sage.  
 
Heywood, A. (1992) Political Ideologies, London: McMillan Press. 
 
Hindess, B (1996) Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to Foucault, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 50
 
Holdaway, S. (1983) Inside the British Police: A Force at Work, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
hooks, b (1995) in B. Perry (2001), In The Name of Hate, London, Routledge 
 
Hopkins Burke, R.D. (1998) ‘A Contextualisation of Zero Tolerance Policing’, in R. D. 
Hopkins Burke (ed.) Zero Tolerance Policing. Leicester: Perpetuity Press. 
 
Hopkins Burke, R.D. (1999) Youth Justice and the Fragmentation of Modernity, Scarman 
Centre for the Study of Public Order Occasional Paper Series, The University of Leicester. 
 
Hopkins Burke, R.D. (2001) An Introduction to Criminological Theory, Cullompton: Willan 
Press. 
 
Hopkins Burke, R.D. (2002) ‘Zero Tolerance Policing: New Authoritarianism or New 
Liberalism?’ The Nottingham Law Journal, 2(1): 20-35. 
 
Hopkins Burke, R.D. (2004) ‘Policing Contemporary Society’, in R.D. Hopkins Burke, Hard 
Cop/Soft Cop: Dilemmas and Debates in Contemporary Policing, Cullompton: Willan Press. 
  
(Hopkins) Burke, R.D. and Sunley, R. (1996) ‘Hanging Out’ in the 1990s: Young People and 
the Postmodern Condition, Occasional Paper 11, COP Series, Scarman Centre for the Study of 
Public Order, University of Leicester 
. 
(Hopkins) Burke, R.D. and Sunley R. (1998) 'Youth Subcultures in Contemporary Britain', in 
K. Hazelhurst and C. Hazlehurst (eds) Gangs and Youth Subcultures: International 
Explorations, New Jersey: Transaction Press. 
 
Hough, M., Clarke, R.V.G. and Mayhew, P. (1980) ‘Introduction’, in R.V.G. Clarke and P. 
Mayhew (eds) Designing Out Crime, London: HMSO. 
 
Hughes, G. (1998) Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk and Late 
Modernity, Buckingham: Open University Press.  
 
Jacobs, J. and K. Potter (1998) Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics. New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jefferson, T. (1976) ‘The Cultural Meaning of the Teds’, in S. Hall and T. Jefferson (eds.) 
Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Sub-cultures in Post-war Britain, London: Hutchinson: 65-
116.  
 
Jones, S (1998), Criminology, London, Butterworths,  
 
Kershaw, C., Budd, T., Kinshott, G., Mattinson, J., Mayhew, P. and Myhill, A. (2000) The 
2000 British Crime Survey, London: Home Office. 
 
Kitsuse, J.I. and Dietrick, D.C. (1959) ‘Delinquent Boys: A Critique’, American Sociological 
Review, 24: 208–15. 
 
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 51
Knights, B. (1998) “‘The Slide to Ashes’: An Antidote to Zero Tolerance’ in R. Hopkins 
Burke (ed.) Zero Tolerance Policing. Leicester: Perpetuity Press. 
 
Lemert, E. (1951) Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic 
Behavior, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Levin, J. and McDevitt, A, (1993) in B. Perry, (2001), In The Name of Hate, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Macpherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William 
Macpherson of Cluny, Cm 4262. London: HMSO. 
 
McLuhan, M. (1964) Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
 
Matza, D.M. (1964) Delinquency and Drift, New York: Wiley. 
 
Merton, R.K. (1938) ‘Social Structure and Anomie’, American Sociological Review, 3 
(October): 672–82. 
 
Miller, W.B. (1958) ‘Lower Class Culture as a Generalising Milieu of Gang Delinquency’ 
Journal of Social Issues, 14: 5–19. 
 
Morgan, J. (2002) ‘US Hate Crime Legislation: A Legal Model to Avoid in Australia’, Journal 
of Sociology, 1 (38): 25-45. 
 
Orrock, E. and Hopkins Burke (2003) Youth Crime: A Base Audit of Youth Work Interventions 
in England that Impact on Young People as Perpetrators or as Victims of Crime, Leicester: 
National Youth Association. 
 
Parker, H. (1974) View From the Boys, Newton Abbot: David and Charles. 
 
Pease, K (2001) ‘Crimes, Futures and Foresight in D. Wall (ed) (2001) Crime and the Internet, 
London, Routledge 
 
Perry, B (2001) In the Name of Hate, London: Routledge. 
 
Pryce, K. (1979) Endless Pressure: A Study of West Indian Life-Styles in Bristol, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Reiner, R. (2000b) 'Crime and Control in Britain', Sociology 34(1): 71-94. 
 
Rutherford, A. (1992) Growing Out of Crime, 2nd edn, London: Waterside Press. 
 
Sibbitt, R (1999) The Perpetrators of Racial Harassment and Racial Violence, Home Office 
Research Study 176, Home Office. London. 
 
Smith, D.J. and Gray, J. (1985) Police and People in London: The PSI Report, London: 
Gower. 
 
Internet Journal of Criminology (IJC) © 2004 
 52
Sutherland, E.H. (1937) The Professional Thief: By a Professional Thief, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Sutherland, E.H. (1947) Principles of Criminology, 4th edn, Philadelphia: Lippincott. 
 
Sutton, M. (2002) ‘Race Hatred and the Far Right on the Internet’, Criminal Justice Matters, 
Special Issue on Hate Crimes. No. 48 (Summer). 
 
Sutton, M. (2004) ‘Tackling Stolen Goods Markets is "Root-Level" Situational Crime 
Prevention’, R.D. Hopkins Burke Hard Cop/Soft Cop: Dilemmas and Debates in 
Contemporary Policing, Cullompton: Willan Press. 
 
Tachau, F. (1998) ‘Ethno Religious Violence: Islamic Terrorism’, in C. Moors and R. Ward 
(eds.) Terrorism and the New World Disorder, Chicago: Office of International Criminal 
Justice. 
Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor (1990) 'The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989: 
Final Report ' London HMSO. 
 
Tonge, J (1998) ‘Northern Ireland’ in B. Jones (ed.) (1998), Politics UK, London, Prentice 
Hall 
 
Weiss, J (1993) in B. Perry (2001) In The Name of Hate, London, Routledge 
 
Williams, J. (1989) Hooligans Abroad: The Behaviour and Control of English Fans in 
Continental Europe, London: Routledge. 
 
Williams, J. (1992) Lick My Boots: Racism in English Football, Leicester: Sir Norman 
Chester Centre for Football Research. 
www.aligindahouse.msn.co.uk 
 
Willis, P. (1977) Learning to Labour, London: Saxon House. 
 
Young, I. M. (1995) Justice and the Politics of Difference, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Young, M. (1991) An Inside Job: Policing and Police Culture in Britain, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Young, M. (1993) In the Sticks, Oxford University Press 
 
 
 
